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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of investment subsidized by the federal government’s New Markets Tax 
Credit (NMTC) program, which provides tax incentives to encourage private investment in low-income 
neighborhoods. I identify the impacts of the program by taking advantage of a discontinuity in the rule 
determining the eligibility of census tracts for NMTC-subsidized investment. Using this discontinuity as a 
source of quasi-experimental variation in commercial development across tracts, I find that subsidized 
investment has modest positive effects on neighborhood conditions in low-income communities. Though 
spillovers appear to be small and crowd out incomplete, the results suggest that some of the observed 
impacts on neighborhoods are attributable to changes in the composition of residents as opposed to 
improvements in the welfare of existing residents. 
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This paper examines the effects of investment subsidized by the federal 
government’s New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program, which provides tax 
incentives to encourage private investment in low-income neighborhoods. I 
identify the impacts of the program by taking advantage of a discontinuity in the 
rule determining the eligibility of census tracts for NMTC-subsidized investment. 
Using this discontinuity as a source of quasi-experimental variation in commercial 
development across tracts, I find that subsidized investment has modest positive 
effects on neighborhood conditions in low-income communities. Though 
spillovers appear to be small and crowd out incomplete, the results suggest that 
some of the observed impacts on neighborhoods are attributable to changes in the 




Over the past several decades, the federal government in the U.S. has revisited its approach 
to tackling the problem of persistent poverty in low-income communities. Greater emphasis has 
been placed on market-based incentive schemes that rely on the private sector to provide 
resources perceived as necessary to alleviate poverty and blight in distressed cities and 
neighborhoods. As interest in business-oriented mechanisms to address stagnation in 
disadvantaged communities grew, a number of new programs emerged that attempt to encourage 
private investments in low-income areas, often using tax incentives.  
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program in 
reducing poverty and improving other neighborhood conditions over the course of the 2000s. 
The NMTC, which was signed into law in 2000 as part of the Community Renewal Tax Relief 
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Act, arose out a desire to encourage private capital investment in neighborhoods thought to be 
overlooked during the economic boom of the 1990s. The program provides tax credits to 
investors who make equity investments in Community Development Entities. These entities are 
charged with investing the proceeds from the equity investments in businesses and real estate 
projects in certain designated low-income census tracts.  
In order to identify the effects of NMTC-subsidized investment on neighborhood conditions, 
I take advantage of a discontinuity in the formula used to designate tracts as low-income. The 
discontinuity generates pseudo-random assignment of investment in tracts around a certain 
income threshold. Tracts below the threshold are eligible to receive NMTC-subsidized 
investment, whereas those above it are generally not eligible. However, on all other dimensions, 
the tracts on either side of the threshold are similar. Hence, comparing outcomes among tracts 
within a sufficiently narrow window around the cutoff permits one to draw causal inferences 
regarding the effects of investment subsidized by the NMTC on neighborhood conditions. 
Using data from the 2000 Decennial Census and the 2005-2009 American Community 
Survey, I find modest benefits associated with subsidized investment targeted at low-income 
neighborhoods. Poverty and unemployment rates fall by statistically significant amounts in tracts 
that receive NMTC-subsidized investment relative to similar tracts that do not. While also 
positive, the estimated impacts on other neighborhood characteristics, including house values, 
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, household turnover rates in affected 
communities are slightly higher, which suggests that the observed changes in neighborhood 
characteristics may not be entirely driven by improvements in the conditions of existing residents, 
but rather may at least in part be attributable to changes in neighborhood composition in the 
wake of new investment. Consistent with the modest positive impact of subsidized investment I 
find using survey data from residents, I also detect small but positive effects on total employment 
and the quality of jobs using administrative data derived from unemployment insurance tax 
records. Finally, the results suggest that while the NMTC program may redirect some investment 
dollars from higher to lower income areas and could crowd out some unsubsidized investment, 
spillovers are not large and crowd out is not complete.  
This paper makes several important contributions. First, I shed new light on the effectiveness 
of tax incentives in encouraging local economic development. Much of what we know about the 
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usefulness of tax incentives in revitalizing communities comes from work on state enterprise 
zones (EZs). State EZs provide tax incentives to new and expanding businesses in designated 
cities and neighborhoods. These incentives can take the form of employment credits or income, 
property, or sales tax breaks. Evaluating the effectiveness of EZs has proven challenging, in part 
because of the high degree of variation in program characteristics across states; not only do 
programs differ in the generosity and types of incentives offered to businesses, but they also vary 
in the criteria used to determine communities’ eligibility for the program. As a result, the 
findings of existing studies on the effects of the EZs are mixed. Several papers, such as Papke 
(1994), Billings (2009), Ham et al. (2011) and Freedman (2012), find positive effects of EZs on 
local economic activity and neighborhood conditions.1 However, Boarnet and Bogart (1996), 
Elvery (2009), Neumark and Kolko (2010), and others find that EZs have little or no effect on 
local employment, casting doubt on the effectiveness of tax incentives in spurring growth in 
targeted areas.2 
More broadly, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the impact of a new 
generation of place-based policies in the U.S. Much of this research has focused narrowly on 
housing policy (e.g., Baum-Snow and Marion 2009, Gabriel and Rosenthal 2009, Freedman and 
Owens 2011). The work that has been done outside housing has typically struggled with 
identification, often due to nonrandom selection of communities into programs. I exploit 
plausibly exogenous variation in subsidized investment across communities that results from 
federal rules determining the eligibility of census tracts for NMTC funds.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background on the NMTC 
program. Section 3 details my econometric approach. After describing the data and providing 
descriptive statistics in Section 4, I present results on the spatial distribution of NMTC-
subsidized investment in Section 5. Section 6 examines how this investment affects housing and 
resident characteristics in low-income communities. Section 7 takes up the issue of crowd out 
and the impact of subsidized investment on employment and the composition of jobs in low-
income communities. Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                            
1 Recent work on federal Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities, which were first established in 1994, 
suggests that they have increased economic activity in targeted areas (Busso et al. 2011, Ham et al. 2011).  
2 Notably, most EZ programs involve employment tax credits and target high poverty areas. In contrast, the 
NMTC program uses investment subsidies and targets only moderately low-income areas. 
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2. The New Markets Tax Credit Program 
2.1. Program structure 
Introduced in the late 1990s as a pro-business way to stimulate investment in the nation’s 
distressed areas, the NMTC program was signed into law in December 2000 as part of the 
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000.3 Administered by the Community Development 
Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the NMTC program, 
which allocated a total of $26 billion in tax credits between fiscal years 2002 and 2009, 
encourages capital investment in businesses that are located in low-income neighborhoods by 
offering tax incentives to investors who make qualified equity investments (QEIs) in Community 
Development Entities (CDEs).4  The credit totals 39% of the cost of the investment and is 
claimed over a seven-year credit allowance period, with 5% being claimed over the first three 
years and 6% over the final four years. 
CDEs are domestic corporations or partnerships that meet several criteria. First, their primary 
mission must be to serve or provide investment capital to low-income communities or persons. 
Second, CDEs must maintain accountability to the community by including resident 
representation on any governing or advisory board. Finally, CDEs must be certified by the CDFI 
Fund. A CDE remains certified for the life of the organization as long as it continues to meet the 
mission and accountability requirements. As of December 2011, there were 5,473 CDEs 
distributed across all 50 states and the District of Columbia.5 Among the currently certified 
CDEs are community development financial institutions, community development corporations, 
other non-profit financial intermediaries, government agencies, commercial and investment 
banks, and other for-profit financial institutions (Armistead 2005). 
Each fiscal year between 2003 and 2009, between 40 and 100 CDEs received tax credit 
allocation rights totaling between $2 billion and $5 billion.6 The average allocation to a CDE any 
given year is close to $50 million. While the NMTC program represents only a fraction of total 
spending and foregone taxes among federal community and economic development programs, it 
                                                            
3 See the online appendix for additional details regarding the structure of the NMTC program. 
4 The original NMTC program was authorized to allocate $15 billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2006. In 
subsequent years, the program has been amended and re-authorized a number of times.  
5 The information in this section is derived in large part from the CDFI Fund’s website (www.cdfifund.gov), 
which outlines CDE eligibility requirements in detail and provides a list of current CDEs. 
6 Though originally scheduled to begin in fiscal 2002, no allocations were made until 2003 owing to delays in 
launching the program (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007). 
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has expanded over time and continues to grow both because more allocations have been made 
available by Congress and because tax credits from early rounds continue to be claimed.  
Unlike the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit or the Community Development Block Grant 
programs, which leave decisions about the allocation of funds to states or localities, NMTC 
allocations flow directly from the federal government to CDEs. The CDEs that receive 
allocations are selected through a competitive application process, with less than one-fifth of 
applicants receiving allocations in any given year.7 Once a CDE is awarded a NMTC allocation, 
it has five years to use the proceeds of QEIs to provide equity or debt capital in the form of so-
called qualified low-income community investments (QLICIs). 8  As Figure 1 shows, as the 
amounts that the CDFI Fund allocated to CDEs generally rose over the course of the decade, 
QLICIs increased steadily until fiscal year 2008, at which point they slowed in the face of the 
recession. In 2009, however, investment under the program recovered.9 
NMTC program rules dictate that “substantially all” of the investments made by CDEs go to 
designated low-income communities (LICs), but these investments can take a number of 
different forms. Over 85% of QLICIs take the form of loans. However, since investors’ returns 
are at least in part covered by the tax credit, CDEs have the flexibility to offer below-market 
interest rates or other preferential terms to qualified projects or businesses. Nonetheless, CDEs 
still have an incentive to assist viable projects with strong prospects. Indeed, there is some 
concern that the NMTC program crowds out private unsubsidized investment. Gurley-Calvez et 
al. (2009) argue that crowd out is not complete and that the NMTC program not only redirects 
investment dollars from higher income to lower income communities, but also increases the 
overall amount of resources available for investment in low-income areas. However, research on 
other place-based programs suggests that crowd out is a potentially large concern (Sinai and 
                                                            
7 Applications to the CDFI Fund require CDEs to describe their intended use of the funds in four areas. Those 
areas include business strategy, capitalization strategy, management strategy, and community impact. Each of these 
areas is given a score by each member of a panel of CDFI reviewers that ranges from 0 to 25. Extra points are also 
awarded if the applicant has a demonstrable history of serving disadvantaged communities or businesses, or if the 
NMTC plans to invest most of its capital in unrelated entities. Each reviewer tallies his or her own points and makes 
a recommendation of whether the CDE should receive funding and, if so, how much. CDFI staff then review the top 
proposals, and the NMTC program manager makes the final allocation determination (Rubin and Stankiewicz 2005).   
8 CDEs may be for-profit or not-for-profit; the latter account for about one-fourth of CDEs that receive NMTC 
financing. However, to invest in eligible projects, a not-for-profit CDE must create a for-profit subsidiary. 
9 The QLICI data in the figure reflect reports to the CDFI Fund through December 2009. At $4.6 billion, total 
fiscal year 2009 investment was about 20% higher than what is shown in the figure. Because the outcome data cover 
only through calendar year 2009, I do not consider any investment that occurs in calendar year 2010.  
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Waldfogel 2005, Eriksen and Rosenthal 2010). I discuss the implications of crowd out for my 
analysis and present some suggestive evidence on the extent of crowd out in Section 7.  
Over two-thirds of CDE investment has historically gone to commercial real estate 
development (70% of all investment dollars through 2009). Commercial real estate projects are 
typically easier to pair with other tax incentives. Further, because they are fixed in place, real 
estate projects are unlikely to fall out of compliance with NMTC program rules (Lambie-Hanson 
2008). Of the investment dollars not directed toward commercial real estate investment, most go 
to business development, which mainly constitutes loans to firms. Investments of this kind, 
which constitute about 26% of all NMTC investment dollars to date, are about half the size of 
commercial real estate investments on average. Meanwhile, only about half of a percent of 
NMTC funds go to residential real estate development, in part because the financing of 
residential rental property is not permitted under the NMTC.10 The remainder of the funds (about 
4%) largely goes toward financing CDE activities and loan purchases.  
Through 2009, $16 billion of QEI proceeds had been funneled to 3,278 QALICBs.11 The 
average amount of funding provided by a CDE to a QALICB through 2009 was about $4.9 
million, but this is skewed higher by several very large projects. The median investment was 
$2.3 million. Relative to project costs, NMTC funding is often substantial. Using cost estimates 
reported by CDEs, NMTC financing covers well over one-third of project costs on average (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2010).  
 
2.2. Low-income communities 
In general, communities eligible for NMTC-subsidized investment through CDEs are census 
tracts that meet at least one of two criteria. Tracts outside metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
with median family income (MFI) that does not exceed 80% of their state’s MFI qualify for 
NMTC-subsidized investment, as do tracts in MSAs with MFI that does not exceed 80% of the 
greater of MSA MFI or statewide MFI. Tracts with poverty rates of at least 20% also qualify as 
LICs. A handful of “low-population” tracts also qualify; these tracts have populations less than 
2,000, are located in Empowerment Zones, and are contiguous with another LIC. Finally, several 
                                                            
10 Residential rental property is eligible for funding under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.  




“rural, high out-migration” tracts qualify; these tracts are located outside MSAs, have MFI less 
than or equal to 85% of statewide MFI, and have net out-migration of at least 10% of the 
population between 1980 and 2000.12  
CDEs are also permitted to finance businesses outside of LICs as long as the businesses serve 
a targeted population, which constitutes “individuals, or an identified group of individuals, 
including an Indian tribe, who (a) are low-income persons; or (b) otherwise lack adequate access 
to loan or equity investments.”13 In practice, LICs have received 95% of NMTC investment 
dollars and 96% of NMTC projects.14  
Of the 65,443 tracts in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 39% currently qualify as 
LICs. Of those that qualify, over 98% qualify either on the MFI ratio or the poverty rate criterion. 
Of those, 95% qualify on the MFI criterion; only 1,305 tracts qualify on the poverty rate criterion 
alone.15 Figure 2 shows tract LIC status as a function of its MFI ratio for all tracts with MFI 
between 50% and 110% of state or MSA MFI (the solid dots) and for only tracts with poverty 
rates less than 20% in the same 60 percentage point window (the hollow dots). Consistent with 
program rules, all tracts with MFI ratios less than 0.8 qualify as LICs and are eligible to receive 
NMTC-subsidized investment. Immediately above the 0.8 MFI ratio threshold, the fraction of 
tracts that are LICs drops sharply. In the full sample, only 10.8% of tracts with MFI ratios 
between 0.8 and 0.9 are LICs.16 Among tracts with poverty rates less than 20%, only 4.9% of 
those with MFI ratios between 0.8 and 0.9 are LICs (a handful of low-population and rural, high 
out-migration tracts below the poverty rate cutoff and above the income cutoff qualify as LICs). 
                                                            
12 The NMTC and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which aims to encourage commercial banks and 
savings institutions to assist in meeting the credit needs of lower-income communities, have similar, but not 
identical, formula structures. Census tracts in MSAs are designated underserved under the CRA if tract MFI is less 
than or equal to 80% of MSA MFI (as opposed to 80% of the maximum of statewide and MSA MFI). Census tracts 
outside of MSAs are designated underserved under the CRA if tract MFI is less than or equal to 80% of non-
metropolitan state MFI (as opposed to state MFI more broadly defined). Hence, the income ratio used to determine 
CRA eligibility is always different than the income ratio used to determine NMTC eligibility status for tracts outside 
MSAs, and is different for 36% of tracts within MSAs. Further, not only are previous estimates of the magnitude of 
the CRA’s effects on neighborhood outcomes modest (Gabriel and Rosenthal 2009, Bhutta 2010), but using CRA 
eligibility status (along with a flexible control function using the CRA income ratio) yields no significant results in a 
reduced-form regression analogous to equation (2).  
13 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (HR 4520).  
14 These figures exclude NMTC investment put toward financing CDE activities and loan purchases. 
15 Current designations are based on 2000 Decennial Census data and geographic boundaries. Beginning in mid-
2012, designations will be based on 2006-2010 American Community Survey data and boundaries. 
16 Because few tracts qualify on the poverty rate criterion alone, the discontinuity in eligibility is much smaller at 
the 20% poverty rate threshold. Nearly 70% of tracts with poverty rates greater than 15% but less than 20% are LICs.  
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As I discuss in subsequent sections, as a result of the nonlinearity in eligibility at the MFI ratio 
cutoff, NMTC investment activity varies discontinuously at the 0.8 threshold, which allows me 
to credibly identify the effects of investment spurred by the NMTC on neighborhood outcomes.  
 
3. Empirical approach 
3.1. Model 
This paper aims to identify the effects of investment subsidized by the NMTC on each of 
several neighborhood outcomes. I conduct the analysis at the level of census tract; tracts have 
populations that average 4,000 and are designed by the U.S. Census Bureau to approximate 
neighborhoods.  
Following Chay and Greenstone (2005) and Baum-Snow and Marion (2009), I am interested 
in estimating β1 in the following equation:   
       iiii Ny   X10                    (1) 
In equation (1), ∆yi denotes the change in outcome y in tract i (e.g., the change in the median 
home value or the poverty rate), Ni denotes the amount of NMTC-subsidized investment in i, and 
Xi is a set of baseline (year 2000) tract characteristics. Estimating equation (1) on all tracts is 
unlikely to yield consistent estimates of β1 given that unobserved and unmeasured local 
characteristics could affect both the amount of investment in a neighborhood and also be 
correlated with the outcome of interest. The decision of a CDE to allocate funds to a particular 
area is likely to be influenced by local characteristics as well as expectations about the future 
prospects of an area, each of which may not be fully captured in Xi and might also affect ∆yi. To 
the extent that we cannot control for such factors, the error term εi will be correlated with the 
treatment Ni, which in turn will bias estimates of β1.  
In order to address the endogeneity problem, I adopt a regression discontinuity (RD) design 
that exploits the formula determining the eligibility of tracts for NMTC-subsidized funding from 
CDEs. In a RD framework, whether an observed covariate (i.e., the forcing variable) falls on one 
side of a fixed cutoff value or the other at least partly determines treatment.17 For the purposes of 
identifying the effects of NMTC-subsidized investment on outcomes, I focus on the ratio of tract 
MFI to state or MSA MFI (the greater of the two in MSAs) as the forcing variable. In general, 
                                                            
17 For a detailed discussion of RD designs, see Lee and Lemieux (2010).  
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tracts with MFI at or below 80% of the greater of MSA or statewide MFI are eligible for NMTC-
subsidized investment, whereas similar tracts just above the 80% threshold are not. The 
discontinuity I use is fuzzy since a handful of tracts qualify as LICs on criteria other than the 
income ratio criterion. However, the vast majority of qualifying tracts are eligible based on the 
income ratio criterion. As Figure 2 shows, the fraction of tracts eligible for NMTC-subsidized 
investment falls sharply at the 0.8 MFI ratio cutoff, indicative of the small number of tracts that 
qualify as LICs on the poverty rate criterion, the low-population criterion, or the rural high out-
migration criterion and not on the income ratio criterion.18  
The crucial assumption underlying my empirical strategy is that tracts in a sufficiently 
narrow window around the 80% income ratio are similar along observable dimensions and 
unobservable dimensions. More specifically, and as I verify in Section 4.3, covariates besides the 
treatment that might affect the outcomes of interest do not change discontinuously at the MFI 
ratio threshold for LIC qualification. Meanwhile, although some tracts that fail to satisfy the 
income criterion qualify as LICs and receive NMTC-subsidized investment, the probability of 
treatment changes sharply at the MFI threshold. In particular, as I show in Section 5.1, tracts just 
below the 0.8 cutoff are substantially more likely to receive investment subsidized by the NMTC 
than otherwise similar tracts just above the threshold. Given this, and that the association of other 
covariates with outcomes is smooth through the threshold, we can interpret any discontinuity in 
the conditional distribution of outcomes as a causal effect of the treatment. 
For a population of tracts near the 80% income ratio, LIC designation is assigned essentially 
at random. To the extent that it only affects other outcomes through its effect on where 
subsidized investment is likely to take place, LIC status may act as an instrument for investment. 
The first-stage regression is therefore 
  iiiii vmfLICN  X)(10  ,                              (2) 
where LICi is a treatment indicator that takes a value of 1 if the tract is a LIC and 0 otherwise. 
The forcing variable mi denotes the ratio of tract MFI to the greater of MSA MFI or statewide 
MFI among tracts in MSAs, and the ratio of tract MFI to statewide MFI for tracts outside of 
MSAs. I use a variety of specifications for the control function f, though my preferred 
                                                            
18 In Section 6.2.2, I exploit the multi-dimensionality of the discontinuity by limiting attention to only tracts with 
poverty rates less than 20%. There are not a sufficient number of tracts that qualify on the poverty rate criterion 
alone to identify the effects using that cutoff. 
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specifications use cubic and quartic polynomials in which the polynomial coefficients are 
permitted to differ above and below the cutoff.19 As I show in the results, the estimates vary little 
with different specifications of the control function. Further, as would be expected if the 
identification strategy outlined here is valid, the inclusion of controls in X does not affect the 
results substantially, although they tend to improve the precision of the estimates by reducing 
sampling variability. 
The reduced-form relationship between LIC status and neighborhood outcomes is as follows: 
iiiii umfLICy  X)(10  .                   (3) 
Since the model is just-identified, the IV estimate of β1 is simply the ratio of the estimates of γ1 
and α1 from the reduced-form and first-stage regressions, respectively. 
 
3.2. Identification 
The critical identifying assumption underlying the RD design used in this paper is that 
unobservable determinants of ∆yi do not differ among tracts within a narrow window on either 
side of the cutoff. One potential threat to this assumption is that sorting occurred among 
neighborhoods around the threshold. Although selection into treatment is often a problem in the 
analysis of EZs, it is highly unlikely that sorting occurred in the case of the NMTC. The 2003 
designations I use are based on data from the 2000 Decennial Census, which was conducted 
before the NMTC legislation was even signed into law. Even if officials anticipated the formula 
structure of the NMTC and attempted to influence the returns from the census accordingly, it is 
technically only necessary that they did not have perfect control over the forcing variable (Lee 
2008). It is doubtful that any official had the ability to determine with pinpoint accuracy the 
value of the forcing variable for any given tract; the sampling variability associated with the one-
in-six sample drawn for the long-form Decennial Census, as well as imputation and 
confidentiality protection procedures conducted by the Census, add some degree of noise to the 
data that would have to be predicted by local officials. These factors militate against any 
unobserved sorting around the threshold that might invalidate the RD design. As further checks 
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where p is the order of the polynomial. 
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that no sorting has occurred around the cutoff, in Section 4.3 I provide descriptive evidence and 
test formally that there is no discontinuity in the distribution of the forcing variable at the cutoff 
and that observable baseline covariates evolve smoothly through the threshold. 
Notably, the fuzzy RD design provides a weighted average of the effects of the treatment for 
the subpopulation of neighborhoods near the cutoff that receive investment, with weights 
proportional to the ex-ante likelihood of having a MFI ratio near the threshold. It is unlikely that 
the treatment effect is homogenous across all neighborhoods, and hence it would be misguided to 
assume that the estimated effects would be similar in very high income or very low income 
neighborhoods far from the threshold. The lack of external validity is a common feature of RD 
designs, but it does not imply that the estimates in this paper are not of interest. Indeed, the local 
average treatment effect that I identify is of critical importance to understanding how the NMTC 
program spurs investment, and how this investment affects disadvantaged (albeit not extremely 
poor) communities (i.e., those tracts with MFI near 80% of the MSA or state MFI).  
 
4. Data 
4.1. Data sources 
 The data used in this analysis come from several sources. The first is the CDFI Fund at the 
U.S. Treasury. The CDFI Fund provided data on all CDE investments, including the amount of 
the investment (including total project cost and NMTC funding), the type of investment 
(commercial real estate, business development, etc.), and the location of the investment (street 
address). Using commercial GIS software, I assigned each investment to a census tract. These 
data were then merged with information at the tract level on LIC eligibility, which is derived 
from 2000 Decennial Census data.  
 Baseline resident characteristics of tracts were taken from the 2000 Decennial Census. These 
data include a number of demographic characteristics, including total population, racial and 
ethnic composition, the age distribution, educational attainment levels, household size, 
household and family income, poverty rates, and unemployment rates. The data also contain a 
host of tract housing characteristics, including total housing units, share vacant, share occupied, 
share owned, share rented, share with a mortgage, median age of units, median number of rooms 
per unit, household turnover, and median house value. 
12 
 
 In order to examine how neighborhoods changed over the course of the 2000s, I use small-
area American Community Survey (ACS) estimates for 2005-2009. These data are based on 
interviews conducted by the Census Bureau over a five-year period in the second half of the 
decade. These data do not measure neighborhood characteristics in a given area in a particular 
year, but instead measure average neighborhood characteristics over the entire five-year period. 
The geographic boundaries in the 2005-2009 ACS largely match those used in the 2000 
Decennial Census.20 I extract from the ACS information on house values, household income, 
poverty rates, unemployment rates, and household turnover at the tract level.  
 The neighborhood outcomes of interest are measured as changes between 2000 and 2005-
2009. To the extent that NMTC-subsidized projects take place later in the decade or take some 
time to have an impact on neighborhood conditions, these outcome measures may not fully 
capture their effects and the IV estimates presented in subsequent sections should be scaled up. 
In other words, the overlap in the period during which we observe outcomes and the period in 
which investment occurs may introduce a degree of measurement error that will tend to bias me 
toward finding no effects of investment on neighborhood conditions.  
 The Decennial Census and ACS are each survey-based and provide information on the 
demographic and economic characteristics of tract residents. To the extent that the intent of the 
NMTC program was to revitalize blighted communities, the effects of investment subsidized by 
the program on tract residents are of particular policy interest. Also important, however, are the 
effects on commercial activity in affected areas. Ideally, one would have information on all 
subsidized and unsubsidized commercial real estate investment, business loans, and job growth 
for all tracts, in which case one could quantify the cumulative effect of subsidized investment on 
economic activity as well as the amount of crowd out associated with the program.  
 While I do not have data on all commercial real estate investment and loans for all tracts, I 
obtained administrative data on total employment and the composition of jobs within tracts from 
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) program at the Census Bureau.21 
                                                            
20 There were several exceptions. After 2000, changes in county or county equivalents occurred in Virginia, 
Colorado, and Alaska. Additionally, nine states used 2010 Census boundaries for census tracts in the ACS. I 
normalized all geography to 2000 using crosswalks provided by the Census. 
21 These data are derived from LEHD’s OnTheMap program, which provides annual cross-sectional information 
on jobs at detailed geographies. I include in the sample only private primary jobs; a primary job represents the 
highest paying job for each worker in each year. This eliminates from the sample many low-earnings, transient jobs 
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These data, which are derived from state unemployment insurance records and cover over 98% 
of private sector employment, contain job counts as well as pay categories (fraction of jobs 
paying less than $15,000 annually, fraction of jobs paying between $15,000 and $39,999 
annually, and fraction of jobs paying $40,000 or more annually).22 While these data are only 
available for 2002-2009 and only for 45 states,23 they allow me to test directly for the impact of 
subsidized investment on the number of jobs and the types of jobs available within affected 
communities. In turn, while I cannot quantify the total amount of crowd out associated with the 
program, I can shed some light on whether subsidized investment is generating more or better 
jobs. To the extent that there is differentially greater job growth or a shift toward better paying 
jobs in communities that receive subsidized investment, it would suggest that if there is crowd 
out of unsubsidized investment, it is not complete. 
 
4.2. Summary statistics 
Excluding those in Gulf Opportunity (GO) Zones24 or in tracts with missing information in 
either the 2000 Decennial Census or the 2005-2009 ACS,  QLICIs between 2003 and 2009 were 
distributed across 488 counties and 1,538 tracts in the U.S. 25  Table 1 characterizes the 
differences between tracts that received projects and those that did not. Columns (1) and (2) 
include all tracts, while columns (3) and (4) include only tracts designated as LICs. Every tract in 
the latter sample is eligible for NMTC-subsidized investment, but only a subset received any 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and allows for a closer comparison to past work on the employment effects of EZs. The results are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar if one uses all private-sector jobs. See Andersson et al. (2008) for details regarding the data. 
22 These thresholds are not adjusted for inflation each year, and hence there is a gradually declining fraction of 
jobs in the low-earnings bin and a gradually increasing fraction of jobs in the high-earnings bin. In the empirical 
analysis, I test for whether tracts that received subsidized investment experienced differentially large or small 
changes in the shares. 
23 Arizona, Arkansas, DC, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New Hampshire are excluded because they did not 
provide data to the LEHD program one or more years between 2002 and 2009. Notably, because the LEHD data are 
available each year, the results using them are not subject to the same timing problems associated with results using 
the 2005-2009 ACS. 
24 About two-thirds of tracts in Louisiana and Mississippi and one-fifth of tracts in Alabama (a total of 1,403 tracts) 
were designated part of the GO Zone. Developments in these areas were given special preference in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina. Including these tracts in the sample has little effect the findings overall, but results in a weaker 
first-stage and affects the precision of some of the estimates. 
25 These exclude loan purchases by CDEs. Note that I use the date that CDEs report using the proceeds of QEIs to 
make QLICIs as opposed to the date that the CDFI Fund reports allocating credits to CDEs. Once awarded credits, 
CDEs have up to five years to use the proceeds of QEIs to make investments, and therefore actual investments, 
much less their impacts on neighborhoods, could take some time to materialize. 
14 
 
investment through 2009.26 The first two columns of Table 1 make clear that, as would be 
expected given LIC eligibility requirements, tracts that received investment were more 
disadvantaged than the typical tract in the U.S in terms of baseline demographic characteristics 
(Panel A) and housing characteristics (Panel B). Educational attainment levels, income levels, 
home values, vacancy rates, and other indicators of disadvantage were consistently worse in 
2000 in tracts that received investment later in the decade.  
However, columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 suggest that among tracts designated as LICs, those 
that received investment were comparable along most observable dimensions to those that did 
not. Racial composition and educational attainment levels, for example, were very similar. Not 
surprisingly given that a disproportionate amount of NMTC-subsidized investment occurs in 
urban areas, the share of renter occupied units as well as median home values are somewhat 
greater on average in LICs that receive investment.  
In Panel C of Table 1, I also present average values of the main outcome variables of interest, 
including average changes between 2000 and 2005-2009 in log median home values, log median 
household income, poverty rates (measured in percentage points), unemployment rates 
(measured in percentage points), and the percentage of households in a different residence than 
one year ago (measured in percentage points and labeled household turnover). Even in the 
unconditional means of the outcomes reported in columns (3) and (4), there is some suggestive 
evidence of relative improvement in LICs that received NMTC-subsidized investment. For 
instance, home values increased more and poverty rates and unemployment rates increased less 
in LICs that received investment compared to those that did not. However, comparisons only 
among LICs could be biased by unobservable neighborhood characteristics correlated with 
NMTC-subsidized investment and with outcomes. The RD design outlined in the previous 
section aims to address this problem by comparing only tracts in a narrow window around the 
0.8 MFI ratio cutoff, where LIC status can be thought of as randomly assigned to tracts.  
 
4.3. RD sample 
For the RD design to be valid, a sufficiently narrow window around the relevant threshold 
must be used to ensure that observations on either side are similar along both observable and 
                                                            
26 The number of tracts in column (3) is less than in column (1) because, as discussed in Section 2.2, a small 
amount of subsidized investment occurs outside LICs. 
15 
 
unobservable dimensions. In the main analysis, I limit attention to census tracts with MFI ratios 
(based on 2000 Decennial data) between 0.7 and 0.9 (inclusive). The final sample of tracts in the 
U.S. (excluding Puerto Rico) with all requisite variables available and that are not in GO Zones 
is 17,271 tracts.27 As robustness checks, I consider alternative windows around the 0.8 threshold 
as well as placebo cutoffs. 
In Figure 3, I plot the number of tracts in each half percentage point bin of the MFI ratio in a 
60 percentage point window around the 0.8 cutoff that largely determines eligibility for NMTC-
subsidized investment. The shaded region constitutes the main sample of tracts used the analysis. 
While there is a large concentration of tracts near the threshold, there is no indication of a 
discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable at the cutoff. A McCrary (2008) test confirms 
there is no statistically significant jump in the density function at 0.8. This is consistent with a 
lack of any manipulation in the value of the MFI ratio that might undermine the RD design. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for census tracts in the main sample. In Panels A and B, 
average values for the baseline demographic and housing variables are presented in bins of the 
forcing variable on either side of the 0.8 threshold. There is little evidence that the covariates are 
anything but smooth through the cutoff. Consistent with the density test of the forcing variable 
itself, tests of the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of each of the covariates, as well as 
that of the initial (i.e., year 2000) values of the outcome variables, against the alternative of a 
jump in the density suggest that there is no sorting around the threshold.28  
For the analysis, I sum up the total dollar amount of NMTC-subsidized investment and the 
number of NMTC-subsidized projects for each tract over 2003-2009. Panel C of Table 2 shows 
average levels of NMTC-subsidized investment and projects within each bin on either side of the 
threshold. In contrast to the baseline characteristics presented in panels A and B, there is clear 
evidence of greater NMTC activity immediately below the threshold relative to immediately 




27 Due to missing data for five states and DC, I lose an additional 895 observations in the LEHD sample. I also 
drop from the LEHD sample 209 tracts that have fewer than 20 jobs in either 2002 or 2009 due to cell suppression 
affecting mainly lower population tracts that contributed to implausibly large percentage changes in employment 
over the period. The results are qualitatively similar, but even less precise with the inclusion of these outliers. 
28 Graphical evidence of the lack of discontinuities in the baseline covariates is presented in the online appendix. 
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5. NMTC-subsidized investment 
5.1. Investment location estimates 
First, I present graphical evidence on the effects of LIC status on NMTC-subsidized 
investment in tracts between 2003 and 2009. Figure 4 plots predicted values of each of the two 
outcome variables, total NMTC-subsidized investment (Panel A) and NMTC-subsidized projects 
(Panel B), using various control functions (linear, quadratic, and cubic) as well as average values 
of each of the two variables within half percentage point bins of the forcing variable.29 There are 
conspicuous discontinuities at the cutoff, with sharp drops in both the total amount of NMTC-
subsidized investment and the number of projects on average within each bin above the 0.8 
cutoff. While substantially lower, investment in neighborhoods above the threshold is not zero; 
as Figure 2 suggests, a small number of tracts with MFI ratios above 0.8 qualify on other criteria 
and are also eligible for NMTC investment. However, it is clear that there is a discrete increase 
in the probability of receiving investment for projects just below the 0.8 income ratio cutoff.  
Corresponding regression estimates of the discontinuities in NMTC-subsidized investment 
and projects appear in Panel A of Table 3. Each cell reports an estimate of α1 for a different 
specification of equation (2), including specifications with different functional forms for f and 
with different sets of controls in X. The tracts included in the sample have MFI ratios between 
0.7 and 0.9. The first row of coefficients in Panel A shows the estimated effects of LIC status on 
NMTC-subsidized investment between 2003 and 2009, while the second row shows the effects 
of LIC status on the number of NMTC-subsidized projects between 2003 and 2009. Columns (1) 
and (4) include only cubic and quartic control functions, respectively. The intervening columns 
include additional local demographic and housing market controls as explanatory variables. All 
regressions include county dummies, and I allow for arbitrary correlation in errors within 
counties by clustering the standard errors in each regression at the county level.  
Consistent with the discontinuity gap in Panel A of Figure 4, the first row of Table 3 
indicates that LICs receive on average about $1 million more in NMTC-subsidized investment 
than similar neighborhoods that are not LICs. The results are not highly sensitive to the particular 
specification of the control function or set of covariates included; the estimated effects range 
from $859,000 to $1,110,000. All the estimated coefficients are significant at least at the 1% 
                                                            
29 Figures with varying sized bins appear in the online appendix.  
17 
 
level. The second row shows that LICs receive on average 0.04 QALICBs; again, the effects are 
precisely estimated and vary little across the different specifications.30,31  
 
5.2. Placebo Estimates 
To verify that the observed jumps are in fact being driven by the LIC eligibility threshold, I 
carry out two tests. First, I conduct a placebo exercise using a series of alternative thresholds. 
The results of this robustness check appear in Figure 5, in which I plot discontinuity estimates 
from separate regressions run using 20 percentage point windows around each percentage point 
between 0.7 and 0.9. I present results from regressions including a cubic polynomial in the MFI 
ratio around the false threshold and the full set of controls.32 Due to small sample sizes, the 
estimates tend to be noisier and more volatile for placebo cutoffs at the lower end of the tract 
income distribution. Importantly and as expected, though, except for at the actual cutoff of 0.8, 
the estimated discontinuity gaps are always statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
As a second placebo test, I examine whether there is any evidence of a discontinuity at the 
0.8 MFI ratio cutoff using only tracts with poverty rates greater than or equal to 20%. 
Conditional on having a poverty rate at or above 20%, we would not expect to see any 
discontinuity in NMTC activity at the 0.8 MFI ratio cutoff. In Figure 6, I plot average NMTC-
subsidized investment and projects in half percentage point bins within a 20 percentage point 
window around the 0.8 MFI ratio cutoff using only a sample of high poverty tracts. As expected, 
there is NMTC activity on both sides of the 0.8 cutoff and little evidence of any discontinuity at 
the MFI ratio threshold.33  
                                                            
30 The first-stage regressions reported in Panel A of Table 3 pass standard weak instrument tests (Staiger and 
Stock 1997).  Kleibergen-Paap test statistics, which are robust to heteroskedasticity, fall between 10.6 and 11.5 for 
the estimates in columns (1)-(6) of the first row of Table 3 (which constitute the first-stages for the main IV results). 
Weak instruments would tend to bias the IV estimates (reported in the next section) upward in absolute value. 
However, weak-instrument robust confidence intervals based on the Anderson-Rubin test (Anderson and Rubin 
1949, Moreira 2009) corroborate the main results.  
31 Given the lack of independent exogenous variation in each type of investment, I am limited in my ability to 
investigate the potentially differential effects of real estate projects and business development projects on 
neighborhoods. However, in the online appendix, I explore the extent to which the NMTC program seems to favor 
different types of investment.  
32 Figures with different specifications of the control function and different sets of controls look very similar.  
33 In the online appendix, I also show that there is little evidence of discontinuities in outcomes at the 0.8 MFI 
ratio cutoff for the subsample of tracts with poverty rates greater than or equal to 20%.  
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The results of these placebo tests, together with Figure 4, suggest that the observed jump at 
0.8 is not an artifact of the data, but rather is a real effect driven by the formula structure of the 
NMTC program. 
 
6. The effects of NMTC-subsidized investment on housing and resident characteristics 
Congress established the NMTC as part of an effort to revitalize blighted communities. The 
belief was that, by encouraging private investment in neighborhoods in which access to capital 
through traditional channels might be limited, the NMTC could inject new life into stagnant low-
income communities (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007). Not only might the fresh 
investment in real estate projects and operating businesses facilitated by the NMTC generate new 
jobs, but it might eliminate vacant lots and abandoned buildings as well as generate other 
positive externalities. To the extent that these benefits arise, they should be capitalized into local 
home values. Also, new investment, and any accompanying revitalization of neighborhoods, 
could affect the economic conditions of existing residents as well as change the composition of 
residents in an area. I explore the effects of NMTC-subsidized investment on housing and 
resident characteristics in this section before examining its effects on employment in Section 7. 
 
6.1. Main results 
I begin by investigating the relationship between NMTC-subsidized investment and changes 
in housing and resident characteristics at the tract level between 2000 and 2005-2009. Panel A in 
Table 4 presents OLS estimates of β1 in equation (1), with the change in log median house value, 
the change in log median household income, the change in the poverty rate (measured in 
percentage points), the change in the unemployment rate (measured in percentage points), and 
the change in the percentage of households that lived in a different residence one year ago 
(measured in percentage points and labeled household turnover) as the outcome variables.34 I 
examine how each of these outcomes correlates with the amount of NMTC-subsidized 
investment (in millions of dollars). 35  For brevity, I present only results using third-order 
                                                            
34 I consider changes in each of the outcome variables for consistency and ease of interpretation. Results using 
levels in the outcome years are qualitatively similar. 
35 Given that project size varies substantially and that we would generally expect more expensive projects to have 
larger impacts on communities, I focus on investment dollars rather than number of projects. The results are 
qualitatively similar when I instead use number of projects. 
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polynomial and fourth-order polynomial forms of the control function, but show estimates from 
specifications with no other covariates, with only the control function and demographic 
covariates, and with the control function and demographic and housing covariates. All 
regressions include county dummies, such that the relationships between NMTC-subsidized 
investment and outcomes are identified off variation across tracts within counties.36 Standard 
errors, which appear below the coefficients in parentheses, are clustered at the county level.  
The OLS estimates suggest that there are small and generally insignificant relationships 
between NMTC-subsidized investment and each outcome. The estimates in the first row of Panel 
A in Table 4 imply that, regardless of the particular set of controls used, receiving $1 million in 
NMTC-subsidized investment is associated with a 0.01-0.03% decrease in median home values 
at the tract level. The relationship between investment and median household income is positive, 
but also small in magnitude; receiving $1 million in NMTC-subsidized investment is associated 
with a 0.02% increase in median household income. There is some indication that investment is 
negatively associated with poverty and unemployment rates, but the coefficient estimates are 
generally insignificant and economically trivial in magnitude. Indeed, differences in 
unemployment rates among low-income tracts that do and do not receive $1 million in 
investment are less than a tenth of a percentage point on average. In the final row of Panel A, 
there is some indication that tracts that receive investment experience more household turnover, 
but the estimated relationship is weak. Taken alone, these results might be interpreted as 
evidence that subsidizing the financing of commercial real estate investment and business 
development in low-income neighborhoods does little to encourage revitalization. 
However, the OLS estimates may be biased by unobserved factors that are correlated with 
NMTC-subsidized investment and also affect the outcomes of interest. Panel B in Table 4 
presents analogous results from a fuzzy RD approach in which I instrument NMTC-subsidized 
investment with an indicator for LIC status. Again, the assumption is that LIC status only affects 
the outcomes through its effect on where investment occurs. As shown in the previous section, 
LIC status is strongly predictive of the locations of NMTC-subsidized investment by CDEs. 
                                                            
36 As I discuss in Section 6.3, the results are qualitatively similar without county effects. The results are also 
similar when one weights the estimates by tract population, which is not surprising given that the Census Bureau 
defines tracts in a manner that ensures that all have close to 4,000 residents. 
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The IV estimates are an order of magnitude larger than the OLS estimates. However, the 
standard errors, again clustered at the county level, are also larger; as a result, many of the 
estimates remain statistically indistinguishable from zero.37 The results for changes in median 
home values in the first row of Panel B in Table 4 indicate that $1 million in NMTC-subsidized 
investment leads to a roughly 2% increase in median home values at the tract level. With a p-
value of 0.15, the estimate from the preferred specification in column (3) is close to statistically 
significant. Although median household income appears unaffected, $1 million in NMTC-
subsidized investment reduces poverty rates by about one percentage point off a base of 13%, or 
by about 8%. Meanwhile, unemployment rates in tracts that receive $1 million in investment fall 
by about a third of a percentage point off a base of 6%. Finally, household turnover rates 
increase by about three fourths of a percentage point in tracts that receive $1 million in NMTC-
subsidized investment (off a base of 16%). This suggests that the observed changes in 
neighborhood characteristics are not entirely driven by improvements in the circumstances of 
existing residents, but instead are at least in part attributable to changes in neighborhood 
composition in the wake of new investment.38 
 The fact that the IV estimates are considerably larger than the OLS estimates may indicate 
that treatment is endogenous. The difference in estimated effect sizes could also reflect the fact 
that the IV estimates are local; the fuzzy RD design generates estimates of the average effect of 
the treatment for only those neighborhoods near the cutoff that receive NMTC-subsidized 
investment. These estimates may not generalize to a broader sample of neighborhoods.  
 Overall, the IV results are consistent with research on other place-based programs showing 
that subsidized development has positive effects on nearby home values and other neighborhood 
characteristics (e.g., Baum-Snow and Marion 2009, Freedman and Owens 2011). The results are 
also in line with recent findings that suggest that the provision of local subsidies to attract 
investments is worthwhile under some circumstances (Greenstone and Moretti 2004). The 
magnitude of the estimated effects of NMTC-subsidized investment, however, is consistent with 
                                                            
37 Notably, adding covariates has only modest effects on the estimated standard errors. The stability of the 
estimates, though, helps to establish the validity of the RD design in this setting. For each of the outcomes, we 
cannot reject the null that the coefficients are the same across specifications.  
38 Results using only tracts in MSAs, which receive 80% of NMTC-subsidized investment, are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to the results for the full sample. Controlling for pre-treatment trends also has little effect on 
the main results. See the online appendix for details.   
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much of the past work on state EZs, which point to relatively small impacts of business tax 
incentives on economic activity (e.g., Neumark and Kolko 2010). Indeed, the results suggest that 
to the extent that there are benefits associated with subsidizing investment in poor areas, those 
benefits are limited, and for many outcomes we cannot rule out that there is no effect at all. One 
exception is for poverty rates, where the estimates suggest that reducing by one the number of 
people in poverty in low-income tracts near the 0.8 MFI ratio cutoff over an approximately 
seven-year period requires roughly $23,500 in NMTC-subsidized investment.39 By comparison, 
the $49.7 billion in Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) spending in 2007 raised some 4.0 million 
people out of poverty, implying that the federal government spent about $12,400 per person 
lifted out of poverty under the tax credit program (Meyer 2010). However, direct cost 
comparisons are complicated by several factors. First, I estimate the effects of NMTC-subsidized 
investment on poverty only for tracts near the 0.8 MFI ratio cutoff; reducing poverty with 
subsidized investment may be more or less expensive in tracts far from the threshold. Second, to 
the extent that NMTC-subsidized investment generates externalities in neighborhoods that 
income maintenance programs like the EITC that are tied to people as opposed to places do not, 
comparing costs only in terms of the poverty or income of residents may not be justified. Finally, 
if NMTC-subsidized investment results in any reduction in poverty in affected neighborhoods by 
displacing low-income households or attracting higher-income households, the cost of improving 
conditions for poor individuals on aggregate may be much greater than the estimates suggest. 
The observed increase in the fraction of households that changed houses recently in the wake of 
new investment suggests that household turnover may indeed be an important means by which 
observed changes in poverty and other neighborhood conditions arise. 
   
6.2. Specification tests and robustness 
6.2.1. Varying the window around the threshold 
 To determine whether the particular window around the threshold chosen affects the main 
results, I re-ran each regression in Table 4 for a number of different bandwidths. For windows 
around the threshold as large as 60 percentage points and as small as ten, the OLS and IV results, 
                                                            
39 Given that the average population of treated tracts in the sample is 4,261 and that poverty in those tracts fell by 
one percentage point in response to $1 million in NMTC-subsidized investment, it requires 1,000,000/(0.01*4,261) 
=  $23,500 to reduce by 1 the number of people in poverty in a low-income tract near the 0.8 MFI ratio threshold 
under the program.  
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which appear in the online appendix, are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those 
discussed in the previous section. For example, regardless of the particular window chosen, the 
IV estimates suggest that $1 million in NMTC-subsidized investment in a tract translates into a 
borderline significant 1-2% increase in median home values. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the 
window used, poverty rates are consistently estimated to be significantly lower in tracts that 
receive subsidized investment relative to those that do not. The particular window chosen also 
does not affect the previous conclusions regarding median household income, the unemployment 
rate, or household turnover. The stability of the estimates across different windows suggests that 
the particular choice of bandwidth is not driving the main results. 
 
6.2.2. Exploiting the dual thresholds 
As previously discussed, areas eligible for NMTC-subsidized investment are determined 
largely as a function of the MFI ratio and the poverty rate. Since only about 5% of tracts qualify 
as LICs on the poverty rate criterion alone, I ignore those tracts in the previous analyses. As a 
check on the sensitivity of the results to this choice, I run the analysis on the subsample of tracts 
with poverty rates in 2000 less than 20%.40 Except for a small number of tracts that qualify on 
the low population or high out-migration criteria, those tracts in this subsample must qualify on 
the MFI criteria alone. As a result, as Figure 2 shows, the fraction of tracts immediately above 
the 0.8 MFI ratio cutoff that qualify as LICs is lower in this “low poverty” sample relative to the 
main sample. While conducting the analysis for this limited group of tracts reduces the sample 
size and thus the precision of the estimates, it provides for a cleaner discontinuity in NMTC 
activity to exploit to identify the effects of interest.41 
IV estimates of the effects of NMTC-subsidized investment for the subsample of tracts with 
poverty rates less than 20% appear in Table 5. The coefficient estimates are qualitatively similar 
to the main results for all tracts near the 80% MFI ratio cutoff. The effects of NMTC-subsidized 
investment on home values are positive but still statistically indistinguishable from zero. The 
                                                            
40 This approach is similar to those of Jacob and Lefgren (2004) and Matsudaira (2008), who also have multiple 
forcing variables and limit attention to units that do not qualify on one cutoff to identify the effects of qualifying on 
the other. In the present context, since very few tracts qualify on the poverty rate criterion alone, it is not possible to 
restrict the sample to tracts that do not qualify on the MFI ratio criterion and identify the effects on the poverty rate 
frontier.  
41 See the online appendix for figures showing the discontinuity in NMTC-investment around the threshold for the 
subsample of tracts with poverty rates in 2000 less than 20%.  
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effect on the unemployment rate in the low-poverty sample is very similar to that reported for the 
full sample in Table 4, but the decline in poverty rates in response to investment is more muted.  
That there are some differences in effect sizes between Tables 4 and 5 is not surprising, as it 
is merely a reflection of the local nature of the estimates and heterogeneous treatment effects. 
Tracts qualifying on the poverty rate criterion tend to be more densely populated urban areas 
with greater shares of younger residents, minorities, and renters. Excluding these areas generally 
yields smaller estimated effects of NMTC-subsidized investment on the characteristics and 
composition of residents in affected neighborhoods.  
 
6.3. Spillovers 
 Neighborhoods eligible for NMTC-subsidized investment could attract businesses that would 
otherwise locate in other nearby areas. On the other hand, the benefits from NMTC-subsidized 
investment could spill over into surrounding areas. Specifications that use neighborhoods not 
designated as LICs that are geographically close to LICs as controls will tend to bias any 
estimated effects of subsidized investment on neighborhoods upward in absolute value in the 
former case and downward in the latter case.  
 To determine if and how spillovers affect the estimates, I conduct a series of additional 
robustness tests. First, I run regressions in which I replace the county effects with state effects. In 
regressions with county dummies, outcomes in treated tracts are compared to outcomes to similar 
control tracts in the same county. In regressions with state as opposed to county dummies, 
outcomes in treated tracts are compared to outcomes in similar control tracts throughout the state. 
The former approach, which is that used in the previous sections, helps to control for unobserved 
characteristics of counties that could be correlated with treatment and affect outcomes, but could 
amplify any bias attributable to spillovers. As the first two columns of Table 6 show, however, 
results with state effects are quite similar to those with county effects (the analogous columns are 
(1) and (3) in Panel B of Table 4). The estimated effect sizes in the IV regressions are somewhat 
smaller in magnitude for some outcomes (e.g., home values), but are the same size or slightly 
larger for others (e.g., poverty rates, unemployment rates, and household turnover). Overall, 
though, the similarity in results suggests that any bias owing to spillovers is unlikely to be large.  
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 However, low-income neighborhoods tend to be concentrated within states, and even without 
county effects, treated and control tracts are likely to be proximal. Therefore, in two additional 
tests, I use as controls tracts only drawn from counties that have no LICs and tracts that do not 
share a border with an LIC. The results of these two tests appear in columns (3)-(6) of Table 6. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline IV results in Table 4, again suggesting that to 
the extent that there are spillovers to nearby neighborhoods, they are not sufficiently large as to 
affect the main conclusions. Notably, though, the variability in estimates across specifications in 
Table 6 with and without other covariates suggests that using more distant tracts as controls may 
introduce some omitted variable bias. 
 Of course, the fact that spatial spillovers are not substantially biasing my previous estimates 
does not necessarily mean that there are no spatial spillovers. However, given that 72% of tracts 
with MFI ratios between 0.8 and 0.9 share borders with LICs, the results in Table 6 suggest that 
spillovers are unlikely to be large. Prior evidence on spatial spillovers associated with 
geographically targeted incentive programs is mixed; while some studies point to sizable 
negative spillovers (Chirinko and Wilson 2008), other studies find little or no spillovers. For 
example, also using tracts as the unit of analysis, Ham et al. (2011) find positive but statistically 
insignificant spillovers of state and federal zone programs on neighboring areas.  
 Notably, even if the NMTC merely reallocates business investment from higher income to 
lower income neighborhoods without generating any new investment, it does not immediately 
imply that the program is not worthwhile. To the extent that there are positive externalities to 
new investment that are larger in lower income communities than in higher income communities, 
there is some argument to be made that the government should attempt to redirect some 
investment into poorer areas. On the other hand, if most of the money is funding investments that 
would have occurred in low-income neighborhoods regardless of the program, it would represent 
a more significant concern. I discuss the issue of crowd out in more detail in the next section. 
 
7. Crowd out and employment effects  
A major concern regarding the NMTC is that funds may be allocated to projects that would 
have received financing regardless. A direct test of the extent of crowd out, which has been 
significant in place-based housing programs (Sinai and Waldfogel 2005, Eriksen and Rosenthal 
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2010), would require data not only on NMTC-subsidized business investment and commercial 
real estate transactions, but all business investment and commercial real estate transactions. The 
lack of a discontinuity in these indicators at the LIC threshold would indicate that the program is 
having little effect on overall business activity.  
 I do not attempt to quantify the precise amount of crowd out associated with the NMTC in 
this paper due to the lack of such expansive and detailed data. However, to the extent that there is 
crowd out of unsubsidized investment, one would expect to find little to no effect of NMTC-
subsidized investment on housing and resident characteristics. Yet as discussed in the previous 
section, there is some indication that subsidized investment has positive, albeit small, effects on 
neighborhood conditions. Though still merely suggestive, a change in total employment and the 
composition of jobs in an area in response to new investment would provide more compelling 
evidence that the NMTC program is not merely crowding out private unsubsidized investment. 
Using LEHD data for 45 states between 2002 and 2009, I exploit the discontinuity generated 
by the rule determining LIC status to test whether investment subsidized by the NMTC program 
between those years affected the total number of private-sector jobs and the composition of those 
jobs within tracts. Finding a positive effect on employment and the quality of jobs (in this case 
measured by earnings) would help to rationalize some of the findings with respect to home 
values, poverty, and unemployment. On the other hand, the finding of no effect on employment 
or the types of jobs in a community would not be entirely inconsistent with the previous results 
for neighborhood residents; even if they do not create new jobs, to the extent that NMTC-
subsidized investments have amenity effects (e.g., by tearing down abandoned properties) or 
attract relatively affluent people to an area, they could have positive implications for resident 
survey-based measures of neighborhood conditions. 
I present IV results using the LEHD data in Table 7. The results in the first row suggest that 
investment subsidized under the NMTC program has a modest positive effect on private-sector 
employment. Although imprecisely estimated, the estimates suggest that $1 million in 
investment increases the number of private-sector jobs in a relatively poor tract by about 1-2%. 
For tracts near the cutoff, which on average have about 1,320 private-sector jobs, that translates 
into roughly 20 jobs, each coming at a cost of approximately $50,000. This is consistent with 
cost estimates from other place-based programs aimed at fostering business activity in distressed 
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areas; recent research has suggested that the cost of creating a job under state EZ programs and 
federal Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities programs is in the range of $20,000 to 
$100,000 (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2008). Notably, though, while the job counts exclude secondary 
jobs, there is no restriction on earnings or hours on the primary jobs included in the sample.42 
Hence, the cost per full-time equivalent job is likely well above $50,000. 
The results in Table 7 also show that NMTC investment is associated with a reduction in the 
share of jobs that pay less than $15,000 annually and a commensurate increase in the share of 
jobs paying $15,000 annually or more. Though there was a rightward shift in the distribution of 
earnings across tracts over the time period considered, the shift was more pronounced in tracts 
that received NMTC-subsidized investment. This suggests that, to the extent that subsidized 
investment generated jobs, those jobs tended to be higher quality jobs on average. These results 
are consistent with Busso et al. (2011), who find modest increases in wages among workers in 
federal urban Empowerment Zones. Nonetheless, the changes in shares of jobs in each pay 
category in response to new investment are not large, and in general, we cannot rule out that 
investment had no effect on average job quality. However, the pattern that emerges from these 
results and those results in the previous section suggests that, even though the program is 
relatively new and many of its projects might still be taking root, there may be some positive 
impact of subsidized investment on low-income neighborhoods. 
While not conclusive, these results also suggest that to the extent that there is crowd out 
associated with the NMTC program, it is not complete. This finding is consistent with Gurley-
Calvez et al. (2009), who analyze individual and corporate income tax data and argue that the 
NMTC crowds out some, but not all private investment. The results are also in line with recent 
qualitative work on the NMTC, including studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(2007, 2010) and Abravanel et al. (2007). These reports suggest that while a concern, crowd out 
does not appear to be complete and that some projects would not be feasible without NMTC 
support. 43  Further, both the GAO and Abravanel et al. conclude that although community 
                                                            
42 A primary job represents the job that accounts for the largest fraction of an individual’s annual earnings. The 
results are similar if one includes both primary and secondary jobs in the sample. 
43 In a survey by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2007), 64% of NMTC investors reported allocating 
more of their investment budget to LICs as a result of the credit. However, as the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office acknowledges, these investors have a vested interest in preserving the program, which may have colored their 
answers to the survey. 
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benefits were not a chief concern in CDEs’ selection of projects, there was some evidence that 
NMTC-subsidized investment in poor areas had positive spillovers. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Although place-based policies have grown in importance in recent decades, many remain 
skeptical of their efficacy. Lending credence to this skepticism are numerous studies on 
programs such as state EZs that suggest there is little to no benefit associated with subsidizing 
investment in struggling cities and neighborhoods. However, many of these studies have 
struggled themselves with identification, due in large part to self-selection of areas into place-
based programs. 
The paper adds to the literature on place-based programs by evaluating the effects of the New 
Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) program on neighborhoods. The structure of the program allows 
me to overcome endogeneity and selection problems that have plagued past studies on other 
place-based programs. In particular, a discontinuity in the formula used to determine program 
eligibility for census tracts generates pseudo-random assignment of NMTC-subsidized 
investment to neighborhoods around a certain income threshold. Tracts below the threshold are 
eligible to receive investment under the program, whereas those above it are generally not 
eligible. However, the tracts on either side of the threshold are otherwise similar. Hence, 
comparing outcomes among tracts within a sufficiently narrow window around the cutoff permits 
one to draw causal inferences regarding the effects of NMTC-subsidized investment on 
neighborhoods. 
I find some evidence that investment subsidized under the NMTC program reduces poverty 
and unemployment rates in relatively low-income census tracts, although the results suggest that 
some of these effects are driven by changes in the composition of residents rather than 
improvement in the welfare of existing residents. The impacts on other neighborhood 
characteristics, including home values, are positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
There is also some evidence to suggest that investment increases total private-sector employment 
and improves the quality of jobs in affected areas. However, the estimated effects are not large 
and are often statistically imprecise. I tentatively conclude that while there appear to be some 
positive effects of subsidized investment in disadvantaged neighborhoods, the benefits associated 
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with subsidized investment are modest. This finding is consistent with results from studies on 
other place-based programs, such as the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (Baum-Snow and 
Marion 2009) and the Community Reinvestment Act (Gabriel and Rosenthal 2009).  
More broadly, this paper builds on a burgeoning literature exploiting geographic boundaries 
to identify the effects of various policies and programs. Research along these lines include 
studies on education (Black 1999), the environment (Ito 2011), social insurance programs 
(Lalive 2008), minimum wages (Dube et al. 2010), and other areas. Expanding on this literature, 
this paper exploits a discontinuous eligibility formula that generates quasi-experimental variation 
across geographies in subsidized investment to evaluate a large-scale place-based program that 
aims to reinvigorate distressed communities. While the NMTC program is still in its infancy and 
further research is necessary to establish its longer-run impacts on neighborhoods, this paper 
suggests that its initial effects may be positive, but not large. 
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Descriptive Statistics for Recipient and Non-Recipient Tracts 














A. Demographic Characteristics (2000) 
Population 3884 4378 3854 3982
Share of Pop. Black 0.28 0.13 0.29 0.24
Share of Pop. Hispanic 0.20 0.11 0.21 0.19
Share of Pop. Under Age 5 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Share of Pop. 65+ 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
Share of Pop. Enrolled in School 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.29
Share of Pop. Less Than HS Degree 0.33 0.20 0.34 0.31
Share of Pop. With Just HS Degree 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.32
Share of Pop. With Some College 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.24
Share of Pop. With Bachelor’s or More 0.15 0.23 0.14 0.13
Average Household Size 2.58 2.63 2.58 2.68
Median HH Income ($) 27,659 45,185 27,055 29,392
Poverty Rate 0.26 0.13 0.26 0.22
Unemployment Rate 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.10
B. Housing Characteristics (2000) 
Number of Housing Units 1620 1807 1600 1646
Share Vacant 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.11
Share Occupied 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.89
Share Owner Occupied 0.38 0.62 0.37 0.47
Share Renter Occupied 0.51 0.30 0.52 0.41
Share Owner Occupied w/ Mortgage 0.65 0.68 0.65 0.61
Median Age of Housing Units 42.40 33.79 42.81 39.58
Median Number of Rooms 4.42 5.43 4.38 4.78
Median House Value ($)  106,662 139,238 105,723 92,234
Share in Diff. Residence 1 Year Ago  0.25 0.19 0.25 0.22
C. Changes in Neighborhood Characteristics (2000 to 2005-2009) 
Change in Log Home Values 0.56 0.47 0.57 0.49
Change in Log Median HH Income 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.18
Change in Poverty Rate† 1.18 1.62 1.15 1.67
Change in Unemployment Rate† 0.18 1.52 0.14 1.10
Change in Household Turnover† -2.27 -3.46 -2.21 -3.09
Tracts  1538 60,717 1474 22,224
Notes: Excludes tracts in GO Zones and that are missing 2000 Census or 2005-2009 ACS data. † Measured in 





Descriptive Statistics Near the MFI Eligibility Threshold 
 Value of MFI Ratio 
  [0.70, 0.75] (0.75, 0.80] (0.80, 0.85] (0.85, 0.90] 
A. Demographic Characteristics (2000) 
Population 4153 4207 4291 4365
Share of Pop. Black 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.09
Share of Pop. Hispanic 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.09
Share of Pop. Under Age 5 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
Share of Pop. 65+ 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.14
Share of Pop. Enrolled in School 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26
Share of Pop. Less Than HS Degree 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.20
Share of Pop. With Just HS Degree 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34
Share of Pop. With Some College 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.28
Share of Pop. With Bachelor’s or More 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.18
Average Household Size 2.59 2.56 2.55 2.55
Median Household Income ($) 32,975 34,963 36,967 39,511
Poverty Rate 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.11
Unemployment Rate 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05
B. Housing Characteristics (2000) 
Number of Housing Units 1791 1826 1865 1858
Share Vacant 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09
Share Occupied 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.91
Share Owner Occupied 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.63
Share Renter Occupied 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.28
Share Owner Occupied w/ Mortgage 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.65
Median Age of Housing Units 37.25 36.22 35.43 34.39
Median Number of Rooms 4.99 5.10 5.23 5.31
Median House Value ($) 94,113 97,626 101,404 109,405
Share in Diff. Residence 1 Year Ago 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18
C. NMTC Activity 
Subsidized Investment, 2003-2009 ($Mil.) 0.86 0.75 0.19 0.08
Projects, 2003-2009 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.01
D. Changes in Neighborhood Characteristics (2000 to 2005-2009) 
Change in Log Home Values 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.44
Change in Log Median HH Income 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Change in Poverty Rate† 2.24 2.10 2.21 2.00
Change in Unemployment Rate† 1.63 1.67 1.69 1.84
Change in Household Turnover† -2.66 -2.78 -2.90 -2.70
Tracts  3773 4322 4579 4597
Notes: Excludes tracts in GO Zones and that are missing 2000 Census or 2005-2009 ACS data. † Measured 




     Table 3 
    Tract-Level Investment Location Estimates  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NMTC Investment, 2003-2009 (Mil.) 0.957*** 0.899*** 0.859*** 1.110*** 1.038*** 0.979*** 
 [0.307] [0.296] [0.284] [0.359] [0.347] [0.326] 
NMTC Projects, 2003-2009 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
Cubic in MFI Ratio Y Y Y    
Quartic in MFI Ratio    Y Y Y 
County Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Demographic Controls  Y Y  Y Y 
Housing Controls   Y   Y 
Observations 17271 17271 17271 17271 17271 17271 
Notes: Includes tracts with income ratios between 0.7 and 0.9 (inclusive) that are not in GO Zones and that are not missing 
2000 Census or 2005-2009 ACS data. Demographic controls include log population, share black, share Hispanic, share 
under age 5, share 65 and over, share enrolled in school, share with less than a HS degree, share with HS degree, share with 
some college, share with bachelor’s or more, and average household size. Housing controls include log number of units, 
share vacant, share owner occupied, share with mortgage, median age of units, and median number of rooms. Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clusters at the county level. Significant at the * 10% level, ** 5% level, and 
*** 1% level. 
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          Table 4 
          Tract-Level OLS and IV Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. OLS Results 
Change in Log Median Home Value -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] 
Change in Log Median Household Income 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002** 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Change in Poverty Rate -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0024 -0.0032 
 [0.0063] [0.0060] [0.0062] [0.0063] [0.0060] [0.0061] 
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.0088* -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.0088* -0.0068 -0.0068 
 [0.0045] [0.0043] [0.0042] [0.0045] [0.0043] [0.0042] 
Change in Household Turnover 0.0035 0.0016 0.0094 0.0034 0.0016 0.0093 
  [0.0090] [0.0079] [0.0071] [0.0090] [0.0079] [0.0071] 
B. IV Results 
Change in Log Median Home Value 0.0211 0.0238 0.0228 0.0148 0.0169 0.0189 
 [0.0160] [0.0164] [0.0157] [0.0170] [0.0173] [0.0168] 
Change in Log Median Household Income -0.0018 0.0040 0.0079 -0.0041 0.0007 0.0029 
 [0.0075] [0.0079] [0.0083] [0.0079] [0.0081] [0.0085] 
Change in Poverty Rate -0.8049** -1.0027** -1.1247** -0.5520 -0.7183* -0.8097* 
 [0.3915] [0.4504] [0.4806] [0.3572] [0.4021] [0.4275] 
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.3815 -0.2987 -0.2701 -0.4476* -0.3626 -0.3408 
 [0.2384] [0.2403] [0.2428] [0.2497] [0.2494] [0.2553] 
Change in Household Turnover 0.7266* 0.5493 0.6208 0.8265* 0.7159 0.8252* 
  [0.4086] [0.4063] [0.4207] [0.4437] [0.4368] [0.4658] 
Cubic in MFI Ratio Y Y Y    
Quartic in MFI Ratio    Y Y Y 
County Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Demographic Controls  Y Y  Y Y 
Housing Controls     Y     Y 
Observations 17271 17271 17271 17271 17271 17271 
Notes: Includes tracts with income ratios between 0.7 and 0.9 (inclusive) that are not in GO Zones and that are not missing 2000 
Census or 2005-2009 ACS data. Demographic controls and housing controls are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clusters at the county level. Significant at the * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level.
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          Table 5 
          Tract-Level IV Estimates, Excluding Tracts with Poverty Rates Exceeding 20% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in Log Median Home Value 0.0272 0.0364 0.0403 0.0091 0.0175 0.0250 
 [0.0334] [0.0341] [0.0355] [0.0298] [0.0290] [0.0295] 
Change in Log Median Household Income 0.0093 0.0135 0.0174 -0.0010 0.0029 0.0026 
 [0.0155] [0.0157] [0.0174] [0.0138] [0.0134] [0.0139] 
Change in Poverty Rate -0.3862 -0.4826 -0.5571 -0.0075 -0.0975 -0.0935 
 [0.6354] [0.6348] [0.6799] [0.5355] [0.5313] [0.5525] 
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.3523 -0.4190 -0.4212 -0.2982 -0.3200 -0.3064 
 [0.4608] [0.4619] [0.4787] [0.4107] [0.4068] [0.4157] 
Change in Household Turnover 0.1722 0.2028 0.3695 0.4763 0.5119 0.6347 
  [0.7332] [0.7106] [0.7501] [0.7006] [0.6751] [0.7096] 
Cubic in MFI Ratio Y Y Y    
Quartic in MFI Ratio    Y Y Y 
County Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Demographic Controls  Y Y  Y Y 
Housing Controls     Y     Y 
Observations 15349 15349 15349 15349 15349 15349 
Notes: Includes tracts with income ratios between 0.7 and 0.9 (inclusive), with poverty rates less than 20%, and that are not in GO Zones 
or missing 2000 Census or 2005-2009 ACS data. Demographic controls and housing controls are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clusters at the county level. Significant at the * 10% level, ** 5% level, and *** 1% level. 
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Table 6  
Tract-Level IV Estimates, Tests for Spillovers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Excl. County Effects 
Excl. Ineligible Tracts in 
Counties w/ LICs 
Excl. Neighboring 
Ineligible Tracts 
Change in Log Home Values 0.0066 0.0004 0.0909 0.0483 0.0165 0.0015 
 [0.0175] [0.0159] [0.0945] [0.0528] [0.0154] [0.0154] 
Change in Log Median Household Income -0.0008 0.0039 -0.0136 -0.0061 -0.0051 0.0018 
 [0.0081] [0.0081] [0.0246] [0.0153] [0.0088] [0.0105] 
Change in Poverty Rate -1.0309** -1.1535** -1.8442 -1.1863 -0.4456 -0.6824 
 [0.4603] [0.4978] [1.3797] [0.8592] [0.3997] [0.4947] 
Change in Unemployment Rate -0.5487* -0.3512 -0.8780 -0.5459 0.0695 0.1617 
 [0.2823] [0.2551] [0.9077] [0.5767] [0.2357] [0.2800] 
Change in Household Turnover 0.9394** 0.5271 2.0601 0.8952 0.0452 -0.4761 
  [0.4677] [0.4052] [1.4914] [0.7894] [0.4290] [0.5044] 
Cubic in MFI Ratio Y Y Y Y Y Y 
County Dummies     Y Y 
State Dummies Y Y Y Y   
Demographic & Housing Controls  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 17271 17271 9635 9635 10684 10684 
Notes: Includes tracts with income ratios between 0.7 and 0.9 (inclusive) that are not in GO Zones and that are not missing 2000 Census or 
2005-2009 ACS data. Demographic controls and housing controls are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clusters at the county level. Significant at the * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1% level.
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    Table 7 
    Tract-Level IV Estimates, Employment and Job Composition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Change in Log Private Employment 0.0117 0.0130 0.0129 0.0168 0.0185 0.0163 
 [0.0319] [0.0339] [0.0355] [0.0310] [0.0331] [0.0343] 
Change in Percentage Jobs Paying < $15K/Year -1.0575 -1.0640 -1.1296 -1.2601* -1.2670 -1.3487 
 [0.6821] [0.7217] [0.7695] [0.7442] [0.7891] [0.8419] 
Change in Percentage Jobs Paying $15K-$40K/Year 0.4738 0.5007 0.5676 0.4574 0.4624 0.5191 
 [0.5450] [0.5854] [0.6240] [0.5570] [0.5973] [0.6328] 
Change in Percentage Jobs Paying $40K+/Year 0.5838 0.5632 0.5620 0.8027 0.8046 0.8296 
  [0.5777] [0.6042] [0.6371] [0.6329] [0.6587] [0.6961] 
Cubic in MFI Ratio Y Y Y    
Quartic in MFI Ratio    Y Y Y 
County Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Demographic Controls  Y Y  Y Y 
Housing Controls     Y     Y 
Observations 16167 16167 16167 16167 16167 16167 
Notes: Includes tracts with income ratios between 0.7 and 0.9 (inclusive) that are not in GO Zones and that are not missing 2000 Census 
or 2005-2009 ACS data. Excludes AZ, AR, DC, MA, MS, and NH and tracts with fewer than 20 jobs. Demographic controls and housing 
controls are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clusters at the county level. Significant at the * 
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Fig. 1. NMTC allocations and qualified LIC investments by fiscal year. * Data on qualified LIC 
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Fig. 3. Density of the forcing variable. Bin size = 0.01  
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Fig. 4. NMTC-subsidized investment at the LIC MFI ratio eligibility threshold, 2003-2009. 
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Fig. 5. Placebo tract-level NMTC-subsidized investment location estimates. Regressions include 
a cubic in the MFI ratio, county dummies, and demographic and housing controls. 
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Fig. 6. NMTC-subsidized investment at the LIC MFI ratio eligibility threshold, including only 
tracts with poverty rates ≥ 20%, 2003-2009. Sample includes 1,922 tracts. Bin size = 0.005. 
